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CANSTATE TAXES
REDISTRIBUTE INCOME?
ABSTRA
The evidence presented in this paper supports the basic theoretical presumption that state
and local governments cannot redistribute income. Since individuals can avoid unfavorable taxes
by migrating to jurisdictions that offer more favorable tax conditions, a relatively unfavorable tax
will cause gross wages to adjust until the resulting net wage is equal to that available elsewhere.
The cuirent empirical findings go beyond confirming this long-run tendency and show that gross
wages adjust rapidly to the changing tax environment. Thus, states cannotredistribute income
for a period of even a few years.
The adjustment of gross wages to tax rates implies that a more progressive tax system
raises the cost to firms of hiring more highly skilled employees and reduces the cost of lower
skilled labor. A more progressive tax thus induces finns to hire fewer high skilled employees
and to hire more low skilled employees.
Since state taxes cannot alter net wages. there can be no trade-off at the state level
between distribution goals and economic efficiency. Shifts in state tax progressivity, by altering
the structure of employment in the state and distorting the mix of labor inputs used by firms in
the state, create deadweight efficiency losses without achieving any net redistribution of income.
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National Bureau of Economic Research National Bureau of Economic Research
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Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge. MA 02138
and NBERCan State Taxes Redistribute Income?
MartinFeldstein and Marian Vaillant
State governments cannot redistribute income if individuals can migrate among political
jurisdictions. Although state tax structures may appear to be redistributive. real pretax wages
must adjust in the long run to make each individual's potential after-tax real income the same
in all jurisdictions. If the after-tax real income available to an individual were higher in one
state than in another, individuals would locate in states where real net incomes were more
favorable. In response to differences in the progressivity of tax rates, migration would raise
pretax real incomes of high income individuals in states where suchindividuals were taxed more
heavily and lower pretax incomes of lower income individuals in such states. In equilibrium.
the real after tax income would be independent of the state tax structure)
Although a relatively more progressive state tax structure cannot achieve a long-run
redistribution of income, it does distort economic choices and thereby reduces total real incomes.
This distortion of economic choices involves more than the traditional impact on the intensity
of work effort and on portfolio allocation that cause progressive taxes in a closed economy to
This theory of long-run spatial fiscal equilibrium is implied by the original Tiebout
(1956) analysis and has been recognized by Oates (1972), Stiglitz (1988), etc.. Gordon (1986)
makes a similar point with respect to capital income in open economies.
*MartinFeldstein is Professor of Economics at Harvard University and President of the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Marian Vaillant is a graduate student at
Harvard University and a research assistant at the NBER. We are grateful to members of the
NBER Public Economics Program and the Harvard-MIT Public Finance Seminar for discussions
and comments on this work and to Daniel Feenberg for assistance with the TAXSIM calculations
reported in section 5.
staiclaN.(,0794have a greater dead weight loss than a proportional tax that raises an equal amount of revenue
(Musgrave.1973; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). A changein the progressivity of the state tax
alsoinducesageographic reallocation of resourcesanda change in the production technology
withinthestate.Aspretax wages of highly skilled individuals rise and pretax wages oflower
skilled individuals fall, firmsareinducedto reduce the number of higher paying jobs and to
increasethe number oflowerpaying jobs.
In short, there is no long-run tradeoff between income redistributionand economic
efficiencywhen individuals are free to migrate. A more redistributivestate taxstructurereduces
economic efficiencywithout changing the distribution of net income. And yet some states and
even some cities do enactgraduated incometaxes anddifferentialsalestaxes. In1992, seven
stateshadno income tax at all while five stateshadgraduatedincometaxeswithmarginaltax
rates thatreached10 percentor more.More generally, as part of this study we have calculated
theoverall state taxrate(including thepersonal income tax, state salestaxand localproperty
tax) in each state in 1983 for taxpayers with incomes of $25,000 and $100,00(Y. The average
tax rate at the$25,000incomelevel varied from less thantwopercent to more than9 percent.
Atanincomeof $100,000, theavengetaxrate variedfrom alowof 1.2 percent toa high of
9.6 percent.Thedegree of progressivity,asmeasuredbythe difference between the average
taxratesat$100,000and at $25,000.varied from ahighof 3.4percent in Vennont to a low of
\Vecalculate these tax rates for 1983 because that permitsusto use the estimatedsalestax
rates by income and family type previously estimated by Feenberg and Rosen (1986). Our
estimates are for a married couple with two dependents. The method of calculating the property
taxes is described in section 4 of the current paper. The NBER TAXSIM model is used to
calculate the state income tax which is then combined with sales tax rates and the property taxes
to estimate the overall tax burden at each income level The actual rates for 1983 (and
corresponding rates for 1989 excluding sales taxes) appear in the Appendix.
2minus 1.7 percent in Wyoming. In 20 of the states the average tax rate was higher at $25,000
than at $100.000.
Since a state tax structure that is more graduated than average does not change the long-
run distribution of real net income in the state but does reduce economic efficiency, why do
states enact such tax structures? There are five possible explanations.
First, the transition to the long-mn equilibrium in which changes in pretax real incomes
offset changes in tax rates may take such a long time to occur that a substantial amount of fiscal
redistribution is possible. Voting majorities may enact graduated tax structures to redistribute
income during this transition period. Even though there is no long-run opportunity for a tradeoff
between income redistribution and economic efficiency, there could in principle be a present
value tradeoff between the politically desired income redistribution and the loss of economic
efficiency. We shall refer to this explanation as the delayed a4iusflnenthypothesis.An
important purpose of the current study is to assess not only whether the independence of net
wages from the state tax structure occurs in the long run but also whetherthe adjustment to
changes in state tax structures happens very slowly or so quickly that the delayed adjustment
hypothesis cannot justify attempts at redistributive tax policy.
The second possible explanation is that a more graduated tax structure may reflect the
structure of benefits provided by the state, leaving no net fiscal redistribution. We refer to this
as the benefit taxation hypothesis. Although much of state spending is on services likeMedicaid
that benefit lower income households, some state spending like higher education programs and
state education grants to local governments may favor higher income households. What malters
for this explanation is that the extent to which any state's tax structure is more graduated than
3the taxstructuresin other states is matched by a distribution of benefits that differs from that
availableelsewhere by a compensating amount. If the tax structure and the benefit structure
are balanced in this way, the individual has no reason to migrate. To the extentthatthis benefit
taxation hypothesis is true, the degree of tax progressivity in the state will not alter real pretax
wages.
The third possible explanation, which wedenote thetax capitalizationhypothesis, is that
thechange in real pretax wages is achieved in part by changes in property values rather than (or
in addition to) changes in money wages. In the extreme, if money wages were unchanged and
the state tax structure was reflected wholly in property values, there would be no deadweight
loss and a once and for all redistribution based on the initial distribution of property ownership.
More generally, even if the capitalization of taxes in property values were only partially true,
an increase in progressivity might lower the value of property in the high income areas of the
state and raise the value of property in low income ares of the state. A state that wanted to
reduce the wealth of current high income residents and to increase the wealth of the owners of
lower income housing (many of whom would be the higher income owners of the apartments of
the lower income renters) could achieve this by an increase in the progressivity of the state
income and sales tax.
A fourth possible explanation is federaltar deductibility. Amore graduated tax structure
causes the federal government to increase its indirect fiscal subsidy to the state because higher
income residents are more likely to deduct taxes in calculating federal taxable income and
because these deductions will generally be subject to higher federal marginal tax rates. The
federal deductibility reduces but does not eliminate the local deadweight loss and does provide
4some compensation for accepting that loss. In a separate paper we have examined the hypothesis
that federal tax deductibility explains state tax progressivity and find no statistical support. State
taxes are not more progressive where deductibility is more common or where the federal
marginal tax rate of itemizers is greater (Feldstein and Vaillant, 1994).
The rmal possible explanation that we consider is fiscal illusion. Even if the adjustment
delays areverysmall, so thatessentiallyno redistribution of realincomeis achieved, politicians
may promote a graduated tax structure because they expect it to be popular with a majority of
voters who do not understand that pretax real wages would adjust, leaving no change in real
disposable incomes. Alternatively, the politicians themselves may not understand that no real
income redistribution is achieved by changing the rate structure.
l'hese alternative explanations have very different implications for the relation between
thestate tax structure and the wages of individuals in that state. Each of the first three
explanations implies that the money wages of employees in the state will not have adjusted
enough to offset differences in state tax rates. Individuals with the same human capital would
earn different net-of-tax money wages because the equilibrium adjustment has not yet occurred
(the delayed adjustment hypothesis) or because those differences in net money wages arc
compensatedbydifferences in benefits (the benefittaxationhypothesis) or by differences in
propertyvalues and associated rental costs(the capitalization hypothesis).
Theeconometric estimates that we present in this paper imply the opposite: pretax
money wages have adjusted so that state tax rates (net of federal deductibility) do not affect net-
of-tax money wages. The net-of-tax money wage that an individual earns reflects his or her
human capital (education, experience, etc.) and not the tax rate that the individual faces in the
5particular state. This indicates that the adjustment of wages to tax rates is fast enough so that
the delayed adjustmenthypothesis cannotjustify the desire to have a more progressive tax
structure. Similarly, it shows that there are not differences in property values or state benefit
distributions (or a combination of the two) that need to be compensated by differences in net-of-
tax money wages. The data therefore suggest that attempts at using state taxes to redistribute
income are based on fiscal illusion, i.e., that the true effect of changing state tax progressivity
is not understood by politicians, voters, or both. Only the federal government or, equivalently,
states acting in concert can achieve a redistribution of after-tax income?
Section 1 of this paper discusses our approach to analyzing the effect of state tax
progressivity and some of the caveats that should be borne in mind when interpreting the
econometric evidence. The second section presents a formal model of the relation between
progressivity, property values and wages. Section 3 discusses our data and the construction of
key variables. The econometric issues of endogeneity and state-specific effects are discussed
briefly in the fourth section. The statistical estimates are presented in section 5. The final
section comments on the implications of the findings for the use of graduated taxes at the state
and local level and, more generally, in countries when there is substantial scope for inward and
outward migration.
'If a large enough number of states raised tax progressivity, the individuals in those states
would have a more limited opportunity to migrate elsewhere and the migration would cause
pretax wages in the remaining states to decline by more than a marginal amount. No single
'small" state can achieve a redistribution olafler-tax income.
61. State Tax Progressivitv and Real Net Wages
In the very longnm,an individual's utility level must be independent of the state where
he or she lives. If a higher utility level were available elsewhere, the individual would move
to the alternative jurisdiction. In a simplified model, this is equivalent to saying that the net-of-
tax wage does not reflect the local tax structure. The net wage depends only on the individual's
human capital attributes (education, age, experience, etc) and on the characteristics that make
the state a more or less desirable place to live (e.g., climate, recreational opportunities, public
services, general cost of living, etc.). Thus,
(1) w =f{humancapital attributes of individual i, characteristics of state s }+ e1
where wNI is the net wage of individual i who works in state s. This net wage is the difference
between the gross pretax wage and the combined tax paid to the federal, state and local
governments.
To test this simplified version of the constant net wage hypothesis, we modify the
standard toglinear wage equation relating gross wages to human capital attributes of individual
i (2Q and characteristics of state s (i,) by adding an appropriate tax variable:
(2)lnw1,=cr +3 ln[l-NATR_]+y'x1+ 6'z,+
where NATK. the effective overall tax rate (not the marginal tax rate) for individual i in state s with
proper attention to the fact that state and local taxes are deductible in calculating income subject to
7the federal income tax. If the coefficient of the net-of- tax variable is equal to minus one= -
I), the net wage is unaffected by the tax, i.e., the specification is equivalent to a regression of the
logarithm of the net-of-tax wage [w (I - NATR) ] on personal and state attributes. Conversely,
if= 0 the gross wage is unaffected by the tax so that the net wage falls by the fill amount of the
tax.
Four qualifications and cautions must be noted about this approach to testing the hypothesis
that state and local tax progressivity does not affect real net incomes.
First, as a practical matter, it is not possible to specify all of the attributes of the state that
might affect individuals' desires to live in that state. We therefore use dummy variables to introduce
a separate constant term for each state, replacing the constant a of equation 2 with a separate a, for
each state. In this fixed effects model, the variables that are constant within eaôh state (Q are
automatically eliminated from the specification. This specification also implies that the estimated
effect of the tax variable (i)) refers to effects of the variation of 1-NATR1 around the mean value
of that variable for the state, i.e., the coefficient of the tax variable measures the effect of tax
progressivity rather than the effect of the overall level of the tax variable.
There is one caveat that should be noted about this approach to dealing with state
characteristics. The use of state constant terms to eliminate the state characteristics, like the linear
specification of equation 2, assumes that within the state the level of benefits provided to an
individual is not correlated with that individual's level of taxes. If, contrary to this assumption, the
individuals who pay higher taxes in state s also receive relatively higher benefits from state s (e.g.,
a state university system that is attended primarily by the children of high income residents), the tax
variable overstates the true progressivity of the state fiscal system as a whole and the estimate of f3
8will be biased toward zero, i.e., toward accepting the view that fiscal variables do not alter gross
wages and therefore that net wages are not independentof the tax structure. Conversely, the
opposite bias would be true if states that choose progressive tax systems in order to favor lower
income households also use the distribution of spending to achieve that goal by giving smaller than
average benefits to higher income individuals vithin the state.
The second caveat in interpreting regressions based on equation 2 is that the specification
makes no adjustment for possible differences in the local price index faced by each individual,
particularly for the rental prices of property. Although a change in the overall level of property
rents in state s would be captured by the state constant term, interstate differences in tax
progressivity could in principle cause interstate differences in the pattern of property prices. If high
income individuals face relatively lower rents in states with more progressive tax structures,
evidence that greater tax progressivity lowers the net wages of high income individuals would not
imply that their j net incomes were affected by tax progressivity. The formal model presented
in the next section clarifies this role of tax capitalization in property values and rents.
Third, our analysis interprets the coefficient of the net of tax variable as a measure of the
extent to which potential geographic mobility permits individuals to avoid the extra burdenof the
state's tax progressivity. But even in a closed economy with no possibility of migration or trade,
individuals will bear less than the fill statutory burden of the tax if they reduce their labor supply
by working fewer hours, working less intensively, acquiring less educationand training, etc.
Implicit in our interpretation therefore is the assumption that the response on the intensity margin
is less than the geographic response. Although we believe that there are substantial labor supply
9responses to higher marginaltaxrates4, the scope for the geographic response is greater and tends
to an infinitely elastic response as the time to adjustment increases. Even if the potential geographic
mobility is enough to keep real net wages unchanged, a more progressive state tax structure could
cause some additional adverse labor supply response. To the extent that we attribute all observed
tax shifting to potential geographic mobility, we may overstate its importance.
Finally, our analysis focuses on money income alone and ignores other attributes of jobs.
The specification of equation 2 is incomplete in not recognizing that individuals with given human
capital car choose more fringe benefits and better working conditions instead of higher money
wages. To the extent that they are induced to do so by higher tax rates, the data will show that gross
wages are lower where tax rates are higher and our analysis will understate the extent to which
potential geographic mobility causes tax shifting, i.e., will lead to an underestimate of the value of
2. A Simple Model of State Tax Proaressivity
This section presents a simple model of the long-run effect of state tax progressivity on
the local wage distribution. The model explicitly introduces land values and therefore the
possibility that state income taxes are capitalized in property values.5 The analysis shows that
4See Eissa (1994) and Feldstein (1993) for recent evidence and for references to earlier
studies. Higher marginal tax rates may also induce outmigration because they make the terms on
which individuals can trade their labor for goods less favorable.
We are not aware of any similar model that deals with the effects of state tax progressivity
on wage differentials, Gyiorko and Tracy (1989) and Wallace (1993) discuss how taxes and
other local attributes can affect local wages but their analyses deal withaverage tax levels and
not with the issue of progressivity. Wallace's analysis also does not include property values and
therefore explicitly ignores the possibility of capitalization.
10the degree of substitutability of land use between high income individuals and low income
individuals can have an important effect on the way that money wages respond to changes in
state tax progressivity even though potential mobility assures that changes in state tax
progressivity do not alter real net incomes,
Consider an economy with two groups of employees, the high skilled (denoted by
subscript H) and the low skilled (denoted by subscript L). Their gross wages in the state are
and WL and these are subject to proportional state taxes at rates t1 and t1. The local prices faced
by high and low skill workers (p and pJ may differ because of differences in the prices of
housing services faced by the high skilled and low skilled workers.6 With this notation, the
equilibrium condition that the real net wage in the state for each type of employee is the same as
that available to such employees elsewhere (o and o) can be written:
(3)(1-t1Jw/p =
(4) (l-tw/p =
6The possibility of different housing prices for high and low sKilled individuals (i.e., high and
low income individuals) depends on the length of the adjustment period and the degree of
homogeneity of the property in the state. At one extreme, if the state can be considered a
featureless plane, there can be no differences in housing prices in the very longest time horizon.
If the housing stock changes more slowly than the labor force and, the two types of housing
cannot be converted from one use to the other, different prices per unit of housing can prevail in
a time period that is long enough for labor market equilibrium to be established. Indeed, if the
property in the state is not homogeneous (e.g., some property has nicer views, more convenient
location or other intrinsic virtues), property price differences can remain even in the longest time
horizon.
IIThere are two cases of interest. In the first case, the local price indices can vary
independently because properties are not homogeneous in the relevant time horizon.
In this case, a change in the state income tax rates is capitalized in property prices (and
therefore reflected in the associated rents and in the implicit rents of homeowners). The
gross wages do not change at all to keep the real net wages equal to the opportunity cost in
other states. Since gross wages are unchanged, it is not necessary to consider the production
side of the economy.
This case is important because it shows that an empirical finding that the distribution
of gross money wages is unaffected by the state tax rates (j3 =0in equation 2) would not
imply that state taxes can redistribute real incomes within the state. Although a rise in the
tax rate for a particular group of workers would reduce the net money wage of that group,
the net real wage would be unchanged since the local price index would adjust to stabilize the
net real wage. Of course, an estimate of 3=0 would not imply that the tax differences were
capitalized in property values and that state taxes cannot redistribute income, only that that
may be occurring. Thus, an estimate of ft= 0is ambiguous evidence about the effect of
the state tax structure or real net incomes.
In the second case, which appears from the data analyzed below to be the more
relevant one in practice, property is sufficiently homogeneous that it is better to represent the
local price indices as equal: PH =PL=p.In this case, a change in state income tax rates
requires a change in gross money wages if household equilibrium is to be maintained:
(5) (I —t11)w11 / p =
12(6)(l-IÜWL/P =
Thelevel of prices in the state may change but will not if gross moneywagesadjust enough
to keep net money wages constant; this corresponds to an estimated elasticity of /3 =- 1in
equation 2.
To illustrate how equilibrium can require gross money wages to adjust to keep net
money wages unchanged, we expand the model to include a simplified specification of the
finns' demand for labor of the two types. This model of labor demand is simplified by
assuming that firms are homogeneous, that they sell their product in a national market, and
that their technology is Cobb Douglas. Firms can obtain capital at a user cost of r per unit
of capital. For any arbitrary level of output (Q*),7thefirm chooses the input levels of
capital (K), of high skilled labor (H), and of low skilled labor (L) to minimize cost subject to
the requirement that output is equal to the desired level:
(7)L =rK+wHH+ wLL-?. [KuLPH_Q*]
Thisimplies the firm's four first order conditions that determine K, H, L and X:
(8)r XaQ*K'
'With constant returns to scale, no restricted input, and an ability to sell output at a constant
price in the national market, the quantity produced by any firm is indeterminate
13(9)wL=XIQ*L1
(10)w=X(t—cz—f3)QW'
(11)KLH= Q..
Combiningthese first order conditions for the firm to minimize cost with the two
household equilibrium conditions required for utility maximization (equations S and 6) and
simp1i,ing yields an equation for the wage of the high skilled individuals as a function of the
tax rates:
(12)[(1-cz)/j3] In w11In (1-to - In(1-t1)+ constant.
Thus
(13)d In w = [131(1—a)] { d t/ (l-t,) - d tL/ (1-13 }.
Since I - a is the production function coefficient corresponding to the share of labor and J3 is
the corresponding share of low skilled labor, it is clear that [j3/(1—a)]C1. Thus an increase
in tax progressivity, as measured by the difference between the proportional increases in the
high and low tax rates, causes a less than proportional increase in the gross wage of the high
skilled individual. Similarly, it can be shown that -
14(14) dInWL= -(l--a—)/(l—a)]{d tf(l-tH) - dtL/(l-tL) }.
The economic reasons for this changecan beunderstood easily by considering the
response to an increase in the tax rate on high skilled individuals. Their real wage must rise
to compensate for the higher tax rate. A portion of that rise must come in the form of a
higher money wage since in this case property is homogeneous. Since that higher money
wage for high skilled employees raises the cost of production to the finn, the firm can only
continue to produce in the state if the wage of low skilled employees falls. Of course, low
skilled employees will only remain in the state if the state price level falls enough (through
the decline in the value of land) to offset the lower money wage. This fall in the state price
level also explains why the wage of the high skilled employees does not have to rise by the
same proportion as the decline in the net of tax share. In equilibrium, the combination of
higher money wage for the high skilled employees, lower money wage for the low skilled
employees, and lower land prices keeps the real net incomes of both types of employees
unchanged and the firms • real cost of production unchanged.
The effect of a revenue neutral change in tax progressivity can be calculated by
constraining the overall tax revenue, T = tHwHH + tLwLL, to remain unchanged. The first
order change in tax revenue implies:
(15) dT =WFIH dt11+ wLL dtL =
or, using the first order conditions of equations 9 and 10,
15(16) (1-a—13)XQ*dtH+IXQ*dtLO.
Thusthe revenue neutral change in progressivity implies
(17)dt1=-[(1-a—j3)/3Jd tH;
anincrease in the tax on high skilled individuals must be balanced by a decrease in the tax
on low skilled individuals in a ratio that reflects their shares in total labor income.
Combining this revenue neutral requirement with equation 13 implies that a revenue
neutral shift from a proportional tax (t11 =tJto a progressive tax (t > t3 causes the wage
of the high skilled taxpayer to increase by the same proportion that the net-of-tax share (1-tn,)
decreases:
(18) dlnw =
Thusthis increase in progressivity causes the gross wage to rise by enough so that the net
wage (w11(l -t,1)]remains unchanged. in terms of equation 2, the estimated coefficient of the
net after tax variable would be minus one in this model. It follows also that a revenue
neutral increase in progressivity causes the gross pretax wage of low-skilled workers to lall
by the proportional decrease in the net of tax share, again leaving the net real wage
unchanged:
16(19) dlnwL=—[d(l -tj]f(l -t3.
Returning to equations 4 and 5, it is clear that in this case an increase in progressivity
leaves the households in equilibrium because the resulting change in gross money wages
leaves net money wages unchanged, requiring no change in property prices. Firms also
remain in equilibrium because, although they pay a higher gross wage to high skilled
employees, the decline in the wage paid to low skilled employees is enough to keep total cost
of production unchanged. The shift in relative gross wages causes firms in the state to
reduce the number of high skilled employees and increase the number of low skilled
employees.
The purpose of the analysis in this section is not to predict how wages will respond to
changes in progressivity but to show that even when tax progressivity cannot change the
distribution of real incomes it can change the distribution of money incomes. The gap
between money wage changes and real wage changes could be offset by differential changes
in property prices. Thus an empirical finding that gross money wages are unaffected by
changes in state tax progressivity (corresponding to fi = 0 in equation 2) would not be
conclusive evidence against the proposition that state tax policies cannot change the
distribution of real incomes. At the opposite extreme, a finding that a change in
progressivity leaves net money wages unchanged (fi - I in equation 2) is of course evidcnce
in favor of the proposition that state tax policies cannot change the distribution of real
incomes. We turn now to the empirical estimates of equation 2, aware of this ambiguity and
of the reasons discussed in section 1 why the structure of wages in the state might not be
17independent of state income taxes even in the very long run. Despite these possibilities, the
evidence presented below supports the conclusion that gross money wages adjust to state tax
policies in a way that leaves net money wages unaffected by state tax rules and that this
adjustment occurs fast enough so that the observed differences in state tax rates does not
affect current net money wages.
3. The Data and the Definition of Variables
Our analysis uses the CurrentPopulation Survey (CPS) data for March 1983 and
March1989 to relate the individual's pretax avenge hourly wage rate8 to the net average tax
rate and to a variety of demographic characteristics as suggested by equation 2 above. State
specific constant terms are used instead of trying to identify and measure all of the amenities
and other state characteristics that would influence local wages. The sample is limited to
individuals who worked between 35 and 70 hours per week. Separate equations are
estimated for men and women.
To estimate the tax parameters, we use the federal and state tax rules included in the
NBER's TAXSIM model (and other procedures described below) to imptite net average tax
3Thehourly wagevariable is constructed by dividing the reported usual weekly wage by the
reported usual weekly hours. Since there are problems with the "usual weekly wage" available
in the March 1983 CPS, we match each person in the March data with his or her wage when he
or she is in the outgoing rotation group in March through June.
18rates (NATRIS) to each individual.9 In 1983, the data permit us to define the net average tax
rate of individuali as
(20) NATR1 =FATR1+[1- itemprobab1 x FMTRJ [SATR1 +PATR+SLATR,I.
where: FATR is the share of total income of individual i paid in federal income tax;
itemprob is the probability that individual i itemizes deductions in calculating taxable income
for the federal income taxW; FMTR is the marginal federal income tax rate of individual i;
SATR is the share of total income of individual i paid in state income tax; SLATR. is the
share of the total income of individual i paid in state sales tax; and PATR is the share of
total income of individual i paid in property taxes. The method of calculating each of these
variables will now be described.
The federal income tax share (FATR) is defined as the ratio of the federal income
tax liability to total money income. It is calculated by applying the federal income tax nles
to the income of the taxpayer unit (i.e., the individual or married couple) of which individual
I is a member, using the NBER's TAXSIM Model based on the income and family structure
reported in the CPS data. The federal marginal tax rate (FMTR1) facing individual i is
calculated in the same way.
9The year 1989 is the most recent year for which the necessary data on state income and
property taxes are available. We study the data for 1983 because that is the most recent year For
which Feenberg and Rosen (1986) have estimated the average sales tax paid by different income
groups in different states.
'°ltemizing deductions reduces the net cost of taxes paid to state and local governments by a
fraction equal to the federal marginal tax rate. The calculation of itcmprob1 is described below.
19The probability that the individual itemizes federal tax deductions (itemprob1) is
estimated on the basis of the 1983 and 1989 Internal Revenue Service Public Use Samples of
individual federal income tax returns. These IRS data indicate whether the taxpayer
itemizes, the state of residence, and the taxpayer's income and filing status (single, married,
etc.). We rank the states according to the fraction of taxpayers in each state who itemize and
then divide the states into five groups. Within each state group, taxpayers are classified into
one of 10 income level groups. We use the IRS data to estimate an equation that relates
itemization to filing status and to the 50 state-income categories and use this equation to
calculate the probability that each individual in our CPS sample is an itemizer.
The state income tax share (SATRJ)isdefined as the ratio of the state income tax
liability to the total money income of the taxpayer unit. The NBER's TAXSIM model
contains summaries of the tax rules for defining taxable income in each state and of the
state's structure of tax rates.
The property tax share (PAIR) is the ratio of the property tax that individual i would
pay as a homeowner to total money income. We use the tax that would be paid by
homeowners to estimate the residential property tax liability of all households on the
assumption that renters bear a comparable tax burden through their rent. Our estimate of the
property tax individual i would pay is based on the income of that individual, the national
relationship between income and housing values, and the residential property taxes paid in
the individual's state of residence.
The starting point for our calculation of the property tax attributable to individual i is
the assumption that a homeowner's house value in state s can be approximated by
20= a, h(y1)wherev•, is the value of the propertyofindividual i in state s, a, is an
unobservablefactor that accounts for differences among states in house prices, and h(y is
the national relation between housing vatue and income class1' It is not necessary to
calculate a, explicitly since we are interested in property tax payments and not in house
values per se. We assume that the property tax paid by a homeowner in state s is
proportional to his or her residential property value with an unobservable state-specific
average tax rate (t,). This implies that the property tax for individual i is t, v4 =t,a, h(y.J.
Estimating the individual's property tax therefore does not require separate estimates of the
average state property tax rate (t,) and the relative property value factor (a1) but only of their
product (t,a,).
Since the t, and a, variables are assumed to be constant within each state, their
product (t,a1) can be estimated on the basis of the total residential property tax paid in state
s. The total property tax paid in state i is the sum of t, a, h(y1) over all taxpayer units in
state s. Denoting the known distribution of income in state s by f, (y,), it is possible to
calculate S, f, (y1 )h(y1); the value of t, a, can then be estimated as the ratio of total
residential property taxes collected in state s to E, f,, (y )h(y1)J2 With that value for t,a,,
"We estimate this relation for 1983 on the basis of the 1983 Annual Housing Survey (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development. 1984) and for 1989 on the 1989 Annual
Housing Survey (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 1991)
'2To implement this calculation for 1983, we use the data on property tax revenue by state in
1983 published in Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations (1985) and data on the
percent of gross assessed value of taxable real property that is residential from
the Census of Governments for 1981 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1984). A similar
procedure is used for 1989.
21the property tax for each individual in the CI'S sample is calculated as t,a,h(y1). The property
tax share in income. PATRistheratioof t,,a, h(y1 ) to the total money income of the
individual.
The estimated share of total money income paid in sales taxisbased on the study of
Feenberg and Rosen (1986). They used the IRS state sales taxallowancefiguresfor1983 to
estimate a regression of sales tax payments on income and family size. We use the Feenberg
and Rosen equation to impute a sales tax liability to each taxpayer and therefore to calculate
the corresponding income share, SLATR1.
Thedemographic variables included in our specification of equation 2 are marital
status, number of children under age 6, number of children under age 18, race, years of
education (as a series of dummy variables), years of experience and its square, and whether
or not the individual lives in an SMSA.
The analysis for 1989 is quite similar)' Unfortunately, there are no data for 1989
that are comparable to the Feenberg-Rosen estimated sales taxes by income class in 1983.
4. The Endo2eneity of the Tax Rate
Because each individual'stax rate is dependent onthe wage that thatindividual
receives and on how much the individual works at that wage, the stochastic error in the wage
equation will be correlated with the net-of-tax variable. Ordinary least squares estimates will
therefore be biased. More specifically, since a higher wage will generally be negatively
"The wage regression for 1989 includes a dummy variable for union membership that was
not available for 1983.
22correlated with the net-of-tax variable,'4 the estimated coefficient of the net of tax variable in
the ordinary least squares estimate of the wage equation will be biased down, i.e., toward a
more negative coefficient.
An instrumental variable estimator can eliminate this bias in the large samples of data
on which our estimates are based. An appropriate instrumental variable should be
uncorrelated with the disturbance in the wage equation but correlated with the net-of-tax
variable that would apply to the expected value of the individual's wage. To construct such
an instrumental variable, we begin by estimating a regression equation relating each
individual's wage and salary income to several demographic variables: education, year of
experience, the square of the years of experience, marital status, children, race, residence in
an SMSA, union membership (when available) and a set of state dummy variables. We use
this equation to form a predicted wage and salary income for each individual. We then
combine these individual predicted wage and salary incomes for husband and wives in
married taxpayer units and add actual nonlabor income for the taxpayer unit. We use these
predicted incomes to recalculate each of the avenge tax rate variables (FATR, SATR, PATR
and SLATR),the probabilityof being an itemizer (itemprob) and the marginal federal tax
rate(FMTR). Finally, we combinethese variables according to the specificationofequation
20tocalculate a predicted Net Average Tax Rate (NATR)and then useln(l-NATR) as the
instrumental variable for In (1-NATR).
"We say "generally' because the net-of-tax variable refers to the taxpayer unit as a whole
while the wage disturbance refers to a single individual within that unit.
235. The Emoirical Results
Table 1 presents the estimatedcoefficients of the net oftax variable [In (1-NATR)] of
equation 2; since the coefficients of the demographic variables and the individual constant
terms are not of direct interest, they are not reported but are available from the authors.
The use of separate constant terms for each state is equivalent to measuring each variable
relative to the mean of that variable for the individual's state. This implies that the
coefficient of each variable measures the effect of deviations of the variable from the state
mean. Inparticular, the coefficient of thenet-of-tax variable measures the effect of the
progressivity of the tax structure rather than the level of taxes in the state.
The first row of Table 1 shows the result for the sample of men in 1983. The
instrumental variable estimate of the elasticity of the gross wage with respect to the net of tax
share ( of equation 2) is -0.62 with a standard error of 0.36. This estimate is not
significantly different from the value of minus one that would imply that tax progressivity
causes no change in net wages.
The estimated coefficient is not just an indication of the long-run tendency of gross
wages to adjust to the progressivity of the state tax structure but is also a measure of the
extent to which gross wages had adjusted by 1983 to the past changes in tax rates. These
changes in 1-NATR reflect not only the changes in state and local tax rates but also the sharp
changes in federal marginal and average tax rates that were enacted in 1981. The point
estimate implies that 62 percent of the existing differences in tax progressivicy had already
been shifted by 1983 through adjustments in gross wagcs
24This evidence on the adjustment of gross wages to tax rates is compatible with three
other types of evidence on the responsiveness of the labor market First, there is substantial
evidence of rapid change in the national distribution of wages in the 1980s in response to a
variety of factors, including changes in technology, trade, and the educational mix of the
labor force (Card, 1992; Freeman, 1994). This experience leaves little doubt about the
general ability of wages to adjust quickly. Second, the evidence on the response of
individual labor supply and, more generally of taxable incomes, to changes in tax rates
shows quite rapid responses (Eissa, 1993; Feldstein, 1994). Finally, the research of
Blanchard and Katz (1992) shows that migration away from high unemployment areas is
rapid enough to return the unemployment rate to normal six years after an adverse demand
shock.
The fmal column presents the corresponding ordinary least squares estimate. The
value of -3.09 shows the anticipated negative bias that occurs because of the correlation
between the error term in this wage equation and the net-of-tax-share variable. The ordinary
least squares estimates are presented in Table 1 only as an indication of the importance of
using instrumental variable estimation in the current context.
The estimated net-of-tax-share elasticity for women in 1983, shown in row 2, is -0.92
with a standard error of 0.33. This point estimate implies an even larger degree of effective
shifting of the tax than the coefficient for men, although the difference between the
coefficients is not statistically significant.
25Table 1
The Elasticity of the Gross Hourly Wage to the Net-of-Tax Share
Row Year Men/Women Sample Sales Tax Instrumental Ordinaty
Size Variable Least Squares
1 1983Men 14070 Included -0.62 -3.09
(0.36) (0.05)
-2 1983Women 9494 Included -0.92 -2.64
(0.33) (0.06)
3 1983Men 14070 Excluded -0.74 -2.97
(0.32) (0.05)
4 1983Women 9494 Excluded -0.86 -2.56
(0.31) (0.06)
5 1989Men 5049 Excluded -2.08 -3.50
(0.34) (0.09)
6 1989Women 3854 Excluded -1.12 -2.44
(0.26) (0.09)
Regression coefficientsare from a regression of In (wage)onIn (1-NA1'R)withcontrols for
education,experience,marital status,number of children, and race. A separate constant
termfor each state controls for the state specific effects.
26Because data on the salestax component of the NATR variable are not available for
1989, we present estimates to show the effect of omitting the sales tax component from the
NATR for 1983. The estimate for men (row 3) of -0.74 differs only slightly From the
estimate of -0.62 (row 1) that is based on the full value of the NATR variable. Similarly,
the estimate for women (row 4) of -0.86isvery close to the full NATR estimate of -0.92
(row 2). Since the difference is -0.12 in the first case and +0.06 in the second case, there is
no evidence of a systematic direction of bias from omiuing the sales tax information.
The estimated coefficients for 1989 are absolutely larger than the corresponding
coefficients for 1983. For men the estimated coefficient is a surprisingly large -2.08 (with a
standard error of 0.34) while for women it is -1.12 (with a standard error of 0.26.) These
estimates also suggest that the response to changes in progressivity is so rapid that gross
wages have fully adjusted to all pre-1989 tax changes.
The data also permit an explicit analysis of the speed of adjustment. We augment the
basicspecificationof equation 2 for 1989 by adding the net-of-tax share variable for 1983 to
the equation as an additional regressor. More specifically, since this is not panel data, we
have calculated what 1-NAfl would have been for individual i (in the 1989 sample) under
27the tax rules thatprevailed in 1983) We also calculatethe corresponding instrumental
variableand usethe two instrumental variables in the estimation. The estimated coefficients
forthe two net-after-tax share variables are:'6
In (1-NATR,,) In (1-NATR<1)
Men -1.64 -0.43
(0.96) (0.60)
Women -1.73 0.43
(0.38) (0.38)
The striking fmding is that the lagged tax variable is not significantly different from
zero for either men or women. This implies that the gross wage in 1989 had adjusted to the
1989 tax structure and was no longer influenced by the tax structurethathad prevailed as
recentlyas1983. The combination of this result and the evidence of Table 1 implies that the
ISihiscalculation for 1983 excludes the sales taxes because they are not available for 1989.
Although the tax rates and progressivity measures are of course correlated across states between
1983 and 1989, there is enough variation between even these two dates so that the evidence of
complete adjustment implies a significant adjustment to recent changes. More specifically, using
the difference between the net of tax shares at $100,000 and at $25,000 as the measure of
progressivity, the correlation between progressivity in 1983 and progressivity in 1989 is 0.89.
Alternatively, if progressivity is defined as the difference between the net of tax shares at
$100,000 and at $10,000, the correlation between progressivity in 1983 and in 1989 is 0.86.
Either way, less than 80 percent of the interstate variation in progressivity in 1989 can be
explained by the corresponding variation in 1983.
'These coefficients are from a regression of In (wage) on In (1-NATR) and In (1-
NA'FR83)aswell as variables for education, experience, marital status, number of children,
and race. A separate constant term for each state controls for the state specific effects.
28adjustment of the gross wage is quite rapid as well as virtually complete, causing the net
wage to remain essentially unaffected by changes in state tax progressivity.
6. Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper supports the basic theoretical presumption that
state and local governments cannot redistribute income. Since individuals can avoid
unfavorable taxes by migrating to jurisdictions that offer more favorable tax conditions, a
relatively unfavorable tax will cause affected individuals to migrate out until the gross wage
is raised to a level at which the resulting net wage is equal to that available elsewhere.
Similarly favorable tax rates attract in-migrants until their gross wage is depressed to the
level at whicn there is no net advantage to locating in the state.
The current empirical findings go beyond confirming this long-mn tendency and show
that gross wages adjust rapidly to the changing tax environment. Thus, states cannot
redistribute income for a period of even a few years.
The adjustment of gross wages to tax rates implies that a more progressive tax system
raises the cost to firms of hiring more highly skilled employees and reduces the cost of lower
skilled labor. A more progressive tax thus induces firms to hire fewer high skilled
employees and to hire more low skilled employees.
Since state taxes cannot alter net wages, there can be no trade-off at the state level
between distribution goats and economic efficiency. Shifts in state tax progressivity, by
attering the structure of employment in the state and distorting the mix of labor inputs used
by firms in the state, create deadweight efficiency losses without achieving any net
29redistribution of income. This same conclusion applies of course to local governments and to
any other politicaljurisdictions,including nations, when there is sufficient scope for
migration.
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33Appendix Table Al
1983Average State TaxRatesat Incomes of $10,000, $25,000, and $100,000
(Income, Sales, and Property Taxes)
STATE ATR(lOK) ATR(25K)ATR(100K)ATR(lOOK) ATR(lOOK)
-ATR(XOK) -ATR(25K)
a .037 .034 .034 -.003 0
AK .061. .032 .021 -.040 -.011
AZ .057 .054 .054 -.003 .001
AR .042 .041 .057 .015 .016
CA .053 .043 .071 .018 .029
CC .058 .047 .054 -.004 .006
CT .082 .048 .032 -.050 -.015
DE .042 .050 .081 .040 .031
DC .081 .079 .098 .016 .018
FL .050 .029 .020 -.030 -.010
GA .051 .050 .058 .007 .008
MI .072 .069 .080 .009 .011
ID .045 .059 .068 .022 .009
IL .077 .059 .049 -.028 -.009
IN .071 .056 .048 -.023 -.008
IA .044 .056 .064 .020 .007
KS .050 .040 .053 .004 .014
KY .056 .049 .045 -.011 -.004
LA .025 .023 .027 .002 .004
ME .069 .052 .080 .011 .028
MD .065 .063 .058 -.007 -.005
MA .093 .078 .075 -.018 —.003
MI .101 .091 .085 -.016 -.006
MM .066 .082 .096 .031 .014
MS .045 .036 .045 0 .009
MO .045 .042 .043 -.001 .001
MT .064 .061 .083 .019 .023
NB .048 .046 .061 .013 .015
NV .034 .021 .014 -.020 -.007
NH .068 .035 .023 -.045 -.012
NJ .081 .056 .053 -.028 -.003
NM .035 .023 .042 .008 .019
NY .070 .065 .091 .021 .027
NC .052 .051 . .062 .009 .011
ND .028 .027 .034 .005 .007
OH .055 .048 .064 .009 .017
OK .031 .027 .049 .018 .022
OR .050 .069 .086 .036 .017
PA .069 .051 .042 -.027 -.009
RI .083 .069 .086 .004 .018
Sc .057 .052 .063 .006 .012
SD .041 .025 .016 -.026 -.009
TN 040 .025 .016 -.024 -.009
TX .032 .019 .013 -.019 -.006
UT .080 .069 .062 -.019 -.008
VT .031 .045 .079 .048 .034
VA .061 .057 .061 0 .004
WA .063 .038 .025 -.038 -.013
WV .051 .040 .062 .011 .022
WI .068 .073 .091 .023 .017
WY .088 .048 .031 -.056 -.017
Based on the state average of property taxes levied at the local level.
Does not include local income and sales taxes.Table A2
1989 Average State Tax Rates at Incomes of $10,000, $25,000, and $100,000
(Income and Property Taxes)
STATE ATR(1OK) ATR(25K) ATR(100IC) ATR(100K) ATR(100K)
-ATR(1OK)-ATR(25K)
AL .027 .026 .030 .003 .004
AK .067 .037 .025 —.042 -.012
AZ .050 .052 .054 .004 .002
AR .036 .040 .055 .019 .015
CA .034 .027 .063 .029 .035
CO .063 .054 .052 -.010 -.002
CT .059 .033 .026 -.033 -.007
DE .037 .044 .060 .024 .017
DC .077 .075 .099 .011 .014
FL .042 .023 .016 -.026 -.007
GA .044 .050 .056 .012 .006
HI .025 .043 .068 .044 .025
ID .039 .059 .069 .029 .009
XL .062 .048 .043 -.019 -.005
IN - .059 .049 .045 -.014 -.004
IA .057 .052 .060 .003 .008
KS .035 .040 .035 0 -.005
KY .051 .043 .041 -.010 -.002
LA .025 .027 .032 .008 .005
ME .054 .053 .074 .020 .021
MD .060 .055 .053 -.009 -.002
MA .049 .069 .070 .020 0
MX .080 .066 .064 -.016 -.002
.053 .062 .073 .020 .011
MS .024 .030 .042 .019 .011
MO .024 .035 .038 .014 .004
MT .065 .070 .091 .026 .021
NB .046 .042 .052 .006 .010
NV .021 .012 .009 -.013 -.004
NH .065 .036 .025 -.040 -.011
NJ .076 .053 .052 -.023 -.001
NM .023 .024 .052 .029 .028
NY .049 .056 .077 .029 .020
NC .058 .061 .063 .005 .001
ND .020 .024 .033 .013 .009
OH .043 .043 .058 .014 .015
OK .028 .036 .050 .022 .014
OR .055 .070 .079 .024 .009
PA .055 .040 .034 -.021 -.006
RI .066 .055 .065 -.001 .009
SC .033 .051 .061 .028 .010
SD .025 .014 .009 -.015 -.004
.020 .012 .009 -.011 -.003
TX .033 .019 .013 -.021 -.006
UT .047 .061 .062 .014 .001
VT .052 051 .065 .013 .015
VA .042 .053 .057 .015 .004
WA .038 .021 .015 -.024 -.007
WV .041 .043 .061 .020 .018
WI .069 .076 .077 .008 .001
WY .059 .033 .022 -.036 -.010
Based on the state average of property taxes levied at the local level.
Does not include local income taxes.